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Abstract: This article aims to characterize the specificity of Discursive Psychology (DP) as a particular theoretical 
and methodological proposal for qualitative research in social psychology, differentiating it from other forms of 
qualitative research and discourse analysis in this area. In order to do this, we highlight the important influence of the 
ethnomethodological perspective as a central theoretical background of the DP, largely defining its conceptualization 
of social order and its approach to empirical work. First, we characterized the ethnomethodological approach to social 
reality, emphasizing how it conceives the social actor, the social order and the social action. After that, we describe the 
way in which DP adopts certain theoretical and methodological principles of the ethnomethodological tradition, which 
allow a better understanding of the specificity of DP in the field of qualitative research in social psychology.
Keywords: discourse, social psychology, ethnomethodology, qualitative research.
Introduction
Discursive Psychology (DP), which emerged from 
the end of the 1980s in England, is one of the most impor-
tant theoretical/methodological developments in the field 
of the contemporary Social Psychology. Assuming the 
implications of the linguistic turn in the Social Sciences 
and Humanities (Rorty, 1998), and developing a strong 
criticism of the cognitive and neopositivist matrix of the 
hegemonic Social Psychology, DP has been constituted in 
a theoretical perspective and an empirical research model, 
offering an alternative way of conceptualizing and study-
ing psychological phenomena and psychosocial processes1 
Billig, 2012; Augoustinos & Tileaga, 2012; Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Edwards, 2003; Garay, Iñiguez, Martínez, 
2003; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Potter, 2000a, 2000b; Potter & Edwards, 2001; Sisto, 2012; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1988).
Starting from thorough analysis of the discursive 
practices in their usual contexts and of the consideration 
of language as social action and configuring mechanism of 
realities, DP offers a new approach in the “psychological” 
field, which breaks with the distinction between “internal 
1 In 2012, The British Journal of Social Psychology dedicated a special 
number entitled “Twenty five years of Discursive Psychology”. This is 
in the context of the completion of 25 years of the Discourse and Rhe-
toric Group (DARG), of the Department of Social Sciences, Loughbo-
rough University, which has been the main actor in the emergence and 
development of Discursive Psychology.
* Corresponding address: antarmar@gmail.com, antar_martinez@ucol.mx
cognition” and “external world” that underlies dominant so-
cial cognitive approaches (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987). The study focus of DP are actions that, 
through the discourse, individuals carry out in different 
practical situations, as well as the way in which partici-
pants, in such interaction contexts, build special versions 
of the world and the “mental reality” aimed at the achieve-
ment of certain pragmatic purposes (Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Potter, 2000a, b). Thus, the interest–rather than in 
the “psychological entities” understood as abstract and for-
malizable internal psychic dynamics in certain universal 
rules–is in how individuals use, in their life social, vari-
ous psychological notions (“I thought”, “I remembered”, 
“I felt that way”) and produce within the framework of a 
local and specific discursive action what can be considered 
the “psychological” field. As pointed out by Edwards and 
Potter (1992), “rather than seeing the study of discourse as 
a pathway to individual’s inner life, whether it be cogni-
tive processes, motivations or some other mental stuff, we 
see psychological issues as constructed and deployed in the 
discourse itself” (p. 127).
This perspective approaches the study of classic 
psychological processes and psychosocial categories re-
garding the use, by analyzing the ways in which an individ-
ual located in a specific field of discursive interaction seeks 
to achieve certain practical purposes. Thus, for example, 
it is interested in the way in which the individual explains 
and accounts for their actions creating a certain account of 
the past (memory); in which rhetorically builds a particular 
version of the facts presenting it as an objective, factual 
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report (knowledge); in which assigns specific responsibili-
ties to others and themselves within the framework of the 
events occurred (assignment); in which develops, in the 
concrete use they make of language, specific evaluations of 
people and objects (attitudes) and positions themselves and 
others through certain linguistic strategies in a particular 
identity (social identity). In other words again of Edwards 
and Potter (1992):
Rather than seeing such discursive constructions 
as expressions of speaker’s underlying cognitive 
states, they are examined in the context of their oc-
currence as situated and occasioned constructions 
whose precise nature makes sense, to participants 
and analysts alike, in terms of the social actions 
those descriptions accomplish (p. 2,3).
DP although shares, with others alternative ap-
proaches (comprehensive, hermeneutic and/or phenom-
enological) of the social psychology, its commitment to the 
qualitative research, its criticism to social cognitive and 
experimental approaches of psychosocial research, and its 
distancing from structural-functionalist perspectives of the 
social theory; at the theoretical and methodological level, 
it also presents important differences and specificities re-
garding these other alternative approaches to the Social 
Psychology (Iñiguez, 2006). Thus, for example, DP’s focus 
is not placed primarily, as in much of the current qualitative 
psychosocial research, on the reconstruction and interpreta-
tion–through any method based on the logic of qualitative 
content analysis–of the meanings and senses that the indi-
viduals develop from their own action and social objects. 
On the contrary, DP places at the center of research on so-
cial action, the way in which people interact with each other 
on a daily basis and co-build, through different discursive 
practices, the social world and the domain of the “psycho-
logical”. It is a social psychology of practices focused on em-
pirically and rigorously studying–using the methodological 
tools of discourse analysis–discursive practices from which 
the social action is organized, produced and regulated lo-
cally (Potter & Edwards, 2001; Wetherell & Potter, 1988).
Despite the richness and novelty of its approach, and 
the many opportunities of theoretical reflection and empiri-
cal inquiry that it offers, DP has had, speaking in general 
terms, a poor reception and development in the context of 
the Latin American social psychology. This, said coarsely, 
can be characterized, on the one hand, by the primacy of the 
dominant social cognitive approaches of neopositivist roots, 
and, on the other hand, by a significant (though always 
minority) development in the last decades of psychosocial 
approaches of interpretive cut, which through the recovery 
of phenomenological, interactionist, constructivist, critical 
theory and/or hermeneutical approaches have given a strong 
impetus to qualitative research within the region2.
2 The Magazines Psicologia & Sociedade (Brazil), Psicoperspectivas 
(Chile), Athenea Digital (Spain) and Universitas Psychologica (Colom-
bia), among others, have played a key role in the dissemination in the 
The purpose of this article is to contribute to ac-
count and specify the distinctive characteristics of DP, 
giving some of its most significant contributions and in-
novations to the field of social psychology and qualitative 
research. Specifically, the article focuses on highlighting 
the strong influence of the theoretical and methodologi-
cal postulates of Ethnomethodology in DP, showing the 
way in which this ethnomethodological imprinting gives 
DP a large part of its specificity and singularity as con-
ceptual framework and analysis perspective of the psycho-
social processes (Edwards, 2003; Potter, 2000a; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). Ultimately, this effort aims to contribute 
to show some logic of qualitative psychosocial research of 
ethnomethodological sensitivity less developed in the Latin 
American context3, which rethinks the understanding of 
the social reality and that of the individuals that participate 
in it, placing in the center of its concern the understanding 
of the daily discursive practices and situated from which 
the individuals actively produce and reproduce social life.
In light of this purpose, the article has been orga-
nized as follows. First, a presentation of Ethnomethodology 
is developed as a particular sociological school, emphasiz-
ing the way in which it conceptualizes the notions of social 
actor, social order and social action. This section highlights 
some key concepts of this (micro)sociological school: com-
petent member, reflexivity, indexicality and accountability. 
Then, starting from the development of five axes, it realizes 
how DP assumes in its conceptual frameworks and its in-
vestigative strategies the main ethnomethodological postu-
lates. Throughout this characterization, we seek to clarify 
the theoretical and methodological features that distinguish 
DP from other qualitative approaches in social psychology, 
and even from other methodological approaches also based 
on some discourse analysis methodology. Finally, the ar-
ticle ends with brief final thoughts.
The ethnomethodological perspective: 
social reconsiderations
Ethnomethodology is a sociological theory that 
emerged in the 1960s in the United States from the pio-
neering works of Harold Garfinkel, which was further de-
veloped thanks to the work of researchers such as Harvey 
Sacks, Don Zimerman, Aaron Cicourel and John Heritage. 
The development of Ethnomethodology is embedded in a 
broader context of problematization in the social theory, 
characterized by an important critique of the Parsonian 
Ibero-American space of this boom of psychosocial research with quali-
tative approaches occurred in the last two decades.
3 A revision in the Latin American database of SciELO, which has more 
than 1000 journals, reveals (in general, not with a focus on Psychology) 
only 31 articles that somehow approach as a perspective or object of re-
flection the ethnomethodological tradition. In the same database, we can 
observe the publication in the last 5 years (2010-2014) of only 42 articles 
that are linked, in the abstract, to the category of Discursive Psychology, 
which is often used generically to refer to any study that uses or discusses 
the methods of discourse analysis, and not in the specific and narrow 
sense – a particular theoretical-methodological approach in the field of 
Social Psychology – that we give you in this article.
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structural and functionalist paradigm (which tends to fo-
cus on the analysis of macro social systems or structures 
presumed to precede and determine the concrete practices 
of the individuals), and by a (re)valorization of micro-soci-
ological perspectives of interpretative cut such as symbolic 
interactionism and phenomenological or comprehensive 
sociology. These approaches will focus on everyday life, 
common sense, symbolic interactions, intersubjective pro-
duction of reality and daily practices where the society’s 
production is set and sustained (Alexander, 1990). That is, 
those dimensions that constitute “profound possibilities” 
or, in Goffman’s phrase, the “dirty water of social life”, and 
which had been neglected by hegemonic macrosociologi-
cal studies of functionalist or Marxist cut (Giddens, 1976; 
Wolf, 1982).
Although Ethnomethodology must be understood 
within this broader theoretical context of renewal of ap-
proaches to social reality, it is important not to lose sight of 
the epistemological, theoretical and methodological speci-
ficity and radicality of its approaches (Coulon, 1987). It is 
this specificity that is taken up by Discursive Psychology 
and that allows us not to confuse, for example, the eth-
nomethodological sensitivity with the perspectives of the 
comprehensive or interactional sociologies that, in the 
wake of Weber, Mead, Schutz, Berger and Luckman, con-
stitute to some extent the dominant theoretical matrix of 
the qualitative micro-sociological research in the field of 
Social Psychology.
Then, we will try to account for this singularity by 
discussing the way in which Ethnomethodology conceptu-
alizes the actor, reality, and social action. We will point 
out the way in which these conceptions imply a theoretical 
and epistemological break with traditional (macro)sociol-
ogy, while, at the same time, we will mark, where relevant, 
the way in which the ethnomethodological view distances 
itself from other (micro)sociologies of everyday life. Before 
addressing this task, we make a brief general characteriza-
tion of Ethnomethodology, with the intention of providing 
a framework for a better understanding of the three newly 
identified specific axes.
Ethnomethodology can be understood as the em-
pirical study of practices, procedures, methods and com-
monsense knowledge that social actors use every day to 
make sense of it and, at the same time, to produce so-
cial scenarios in which they participate (Heritage, 1984, 
1995; Robles, 1999; Rodriguez, 2008; Wolf, 1982). As 
Garfinkel (2006/1967) points out in his classic Studies in 
Ethnomethodology, the focus of Ethnomethodology “are 
practical activities, practical circumstances, and practical 
sociological reasoning as topics of empirical study (p. 9). 
It is important to note that, from this perspective, the ob-
ject of study is not the meanings that people attribute to 
the situations of their ordinary life, but rather the set of 
strategies, procedures and methods from which the actors, 
in specific social scenarios, find the appropriate way to 
coordinate and proceed with the action expected in these 
circumstances.
So, it is a sociology of practice focused not on the 
actor’s internal motivations or external determinations, but 
on the various practical methods that develops daily to rec-
ognize and explain social scenarios and act accordingly, 
producing the sense of social reality (Heritage, 1995; Wolf, 
1982). As we will emphasize, for Ethnomethodology, lan-
guage and its different uses in daily life are a key element 
of the methods and procedures of practical reasoning used 
by actors. It is through various typifications, classifications 
and explanations deployed in everyday speech, as an indis-
soluble part of the same action, that the different social sce-
narios emerge and are held locally and contingently (Potter 
& Weteherell, 1987).
We present below three fundamental axes to under-
stand the specificity of the ethnomethodological perspec-
tive: its conception of the actor, order and social action. We 
will try to interweave in this exhibition some key concepts 
that bind or ‘embody’ the sensitivity of the ethnomethod-
ological approach, namely: competent member, indexical-
ity, reflexivity and accountability.
The notion of social actor
Against the functionalist idea of the social actor 
as a sum of status and roles within a structural system of 
social positions that precedes and constrains its action, 
Etnomethodology considers individuals as competent and 
active members within their social reality, endowed with a 
set of knowledge and practical knowledge that allow them 
to participate in the incessant production of the various 
social settings in which they are inserted (Coulon, 1987, 
Ritzer, 1993).
It is considered, according to Schutz, that each in-
dividual is “a sociologist in practical state”, an agent that, 
with their linguistic resources, expresses, describes and 
builds daily social reality (Ritzer, 1993).
More than a mere position in a previous and in-
dependent institutional system, the individual is an actor 
endowed with a practical rationality that allows him to par-
ticipate with others in the social dance of typifications, be-
haviors, explanations, descriptions that are modeling, from 
within the interaction itself, the specificity of the different 
social scenarios. 
The notion of ‘competent member’ serves to anchor 
this conceptualization of the social actor. In ethnomethod-
ological language, this term does not refer to an individual 
belonging to a social category or confined to a collective 
identity, but to a social actor able to manage and use lan-
guage in a given community. According to Garfinkel and 
Sacks (1970, in Coulon, 1987), the notion of competent 
member refers to the use of the common language, to the 
fact that “people, speaking a natural language, are en-
gaged somehow in the objective production and objective 
display of commonsense knowledge of everyday activities 
as observable and relatable phenomena” (p. 50).
In a concrete social setting, competent members 
make a naturalized and non-problematic use of language, 
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which implies that social activities and interactions run on 
a common horizon of understanding that does not lead to 
perplexity, astonishment, or surprise. Everyday scenarios 
that form the social world are lived and viewed as evident, 
natural, ordered, plausible, typical, available, continuous 
and stable (Rodríguez, 2008). As Coulon (1987, p. 51) puts 
it: Everyday scenarios that form the social world are lived 
and displayed as obvious, natural, orderly, credible, typical, 
available, continuous and stable (Rodriguez, 2008). As said 
by Coulon (1987, p. 51):
Competent members do not need to ask themselves 
what they are doing. They know the implicit pat-
terns of their behaviors and accept the routines in-
scribed in social practices. This is what makes us 
not to be foreign to our own culture and, conversely, 
that the behaviors or questions of a foreigner are 
strange to us.
In this way, the actors are not at all times reflecting 
or discussing the procedures, categorizations and methods 
involved in the production of the different situations (par-
ticipating in a class at the university, working as a taxi driv-
er, visiting a museum, discussing politics in a pub, having 
breakfast with the family), but they operate at a tacit and 
routine level. Thus, the competent member has a set of re-
sources and procedures that allow him to conduct himself 
easily in the social world surrounding him. The figure of 
the competent member can be understood as a kind of “ev-
eryday wise man”, which, when he holds a social meeting, 
puts spontaneous and routine knowledge and procedures at 
risk (Íñiguez, 2006; Coulon, 1987), and this ability is pre-
cisely the condition for the meeting to take place.
This revaluation of the individual agent, of his prac-
tical powers and his active and creative role in the con-
figuration processes of the social reality, should not be 
confused, however, with the appeal to an interior space of 
psychological or subjective processes that would account 
for the essence of each person, and that would be “behind” 
and at the origin of the action. The following quotation by 
Garfinkel illustrates this point:
Following a theoretical preference, I will affirm 
that significant events are wholly and exclusively 
the events of the behavioral environment of the per-
son ... Therefore, there is no reason to look under 
the skull, since nothing interesting will be found 
there, except for the brain. The skin of the person 
will be left intact. Questions shall be limited to op-
erations that can be performed in events within the 
people’s environment (Garfinkel 1963, in Heritage, 
1995, p. 301).
Thus, unlike other microsociologies such as 
phenomenology or symbolic interactionism, which in-
corporate a notion of subjectivity, consciousness, self 
or identity in their theoretical models of social reality, 
ethnomethodologists focus on the observable actions of 
individuals in concrete contexts, taking into account the 
discourses that agents produce as part of the action (Ritzer, 
1993). From this perspective, individuals are understood 
not as psychological subjects, nor as agents dedicated cen-
trally to producing stable meanings about themselves and 
the social world, but as actors with linguistic competences, 
with diverse resources and observable knowledge that they 
deploy in their daily practices, and that allow them to oper-
ate in the social world and coordinate with others within 
the framework of the fundamentally pragmatic motivation 
of everyday life.
The notion of social order
For Ethnomethodology, social reality is a practi-
cal realization of social actors. This perspective assumes a 
strong criticism of the Durkhemian and Parsonian notions 
of social facts as independent events, external and previous 
to the daily practices of the actors, who are understood, 
from the functionalist lens, as strongly coerced and deter-
mined by a set of stable and supra-individual institutions 
that structure social reality (Alexander, 1990, Ritzer, 1993).
Ethnomethodology argues that the traditional soci-
ology’s focus on a set of macrostructures (political, eco-
nomic, cultural) that are taken for granted–and that would 
not be accessible to ordinary members of society, but only 
to a social science positivist cut–would have led to neglect-
ing a key dimension of social life. That is, social facts are 
the product of methodical, persevering, reflexive, thought-
ful and competent actions carried out by the social actors 
themselves in practical activities, results that they them-
selves endow, cover and presume as rational and more or 
less correct to the extent that are useful and necessary to 
configure their practical realities (Robles, 1999, p. 180).
The central thesis of Ethnomethodology is that the 
social order is a practical achievement of the members who 
participate in society (Garfinkel, 2006; Ritzer, 1993) and 
not a set of facts or institutions that impose and constrain 
the actors. Thus, social reality is understood as a frame-
work of “contingent achievements of common organiza-
tional practices” (Garfinkel, 2006, p. 44) and in order to 
know it, it is necessary to satisfy the incessant process of 
implementation and production of endogenously organized 
local settings.
It is important to note that the main interest of 
Ethnomethodology is not, as in other micro-sociological 
traditions, the intersubjectively shared meanings that the 
actors have of a social scene or object, nor the intentions 
and meanings that would individually explain the presence 
and action of an actor in said context. The focus is rather on 
the various methods of action and practical reasoning that 
the participants mobilize to recognize, insert, produce and 
sustain particular social situations, such as a medical con-
sultation, a conversation in a store, or a trip in the subway4.
4 In this respect, it is worth recalling Sudnow’s study, “Dying, the social 
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This perspective invites the researcher to recon-
struct “from within” the same local contexts of action, the 
way in which the actors produce and maintain the stabil-
ity, organization and naturalness of a given social situa-
tion. Rather than presupposing that this regularity is the 
product of structural determinants that impose their logics 
of action, and rather than approaching social situations as 
“examples” or “cases” of models and categories previously 
determined by the analyst, it would be precisely to recon-
struct “the set of techniques that the members themselves 
. . . use to interpret and act within their social worlds” 
(Levinson, 1989, p. 281). This reconstruction demands from 
the analyst an effort of “phenomenological suspension” of 
theories and categories of previous analysis (Ritzer, 1993), 
so that it is necessary to reveal, inductively, the categories 
and strategies mobilized by the actors and not to impose 
from outside the situation a set of preconceived schemas 
and models, both descriptive and normative, about social 
reality (Levinson, 1983; Wetherell, 2001).
The ethnomethodological perspective proposes two 
basic concepts to address social reality as situated produc-
tion, determined by the various (etno)methods (resources, 
practices, procedures, knowledge) that people display to 
produce the social order they inhabit: ‘indexicality’ and 
‘reflexivity’.
Indexicality refers to the contextual character of 
ordinary language: words (and actions) acquire their full 
meaning in concrete contexts of interaction. The indexi-
cal expressions are those whose intelligibility depends on 
the situation in which the expressions are enunciated, from 
various elements that are not found in the expression itself 
but in the own situation of enunciation (Coulter, 1991).  It 
is in this line that Garfinkel (2006) reminds us of Husserl 
who
spoke of expressions whose meaning cannot be 
decided by a listener without necessarily knowing 
or assuming something about the biography and 
the intentions of the user’s expression, the circum-
stances of the emission, the previous course of the 
conversation, or the particular relationship of the 
actual or potential interaction that exists between 
the speaker and the listener (p. 4).
Garfinkel argues that the general character of the 
natural language participates in this characteristic and 
organization of death”, which explores ethnographically in a hospital, 
how “death” is managed, circulated and produced as a local social fact 
that is part of the daily life of this hospital. In relation to this research, 
Wolf (1982) points out, in a way that illustrates the difference between 
ethnomethodological sensitivity and that of other microsociologies, the 
following: “Sudnow thus analyzes the sociological structure . . . of death 
(in a specific community delimited in space and time): it is neither an 
analysis of the ‘cultural images of death’ nor of the subjective attitudes 
and dispositions towards it: it is rather a study of how is made, develo-
ped, constructed, contained in the practices, activities, methods of ‘veri-
fying death’, ‘declaring death’, ‘announcing death’, ‘suspecting death’, 
etc.: modes and methods provide in this case the basis for describing 
what is sociologically death in a large hospital center” (p. 116).
that the interaction forms have an indexical nature, so 
that there is no expression that has a complete and defined 
meaning outside its concrete use and the social space of its 
enunciation.
An important part of traditional psychosocial re-
search has been concerned with “repairing” indexical 
expressions in different ways by interpreting them as an 
obstacle to accessing the essential meaning and generaliza-
tion (Coulter, 1991): thus, the task has been to transform the 
“real expressions” and those situated in “ideal expressions” 
and, in this way, to abstract structures and categories that 
are then assigned to indexical expressions as if they were 
their own. In contrast, if we admit that the nature of the 
discourse and social action is hopelessly indexical, and that 
the expressions work in different ways in different con-
texts, the research cannot but be directed towards local set-
tings and negotiations, trying to recover “from within” the 
contingent and situated uses of language that configure the 
specificity of each situation. This is how Garfinkel (2006) 
argues that the indexical nature of language should not be 
considered as an obstacle to an adequate knowledge of so-
cial phenomena, as a source of error or misunderstanding, 
but as a constituent part of the social reality that must be 
investigated as such, without the pretension of translating it 
or reducing it to general and preconceived categories.
On the other hand, the notion of reflexivity refers 
to the constitutive character of the language in use. It indi-
cates that the factual character of a social situation depends 
reflexively on itself, on the way in which the same situation 
presupposes forms of explanation and (self)description that 
configure it recursively. Thus, “the property of reflexivity 
has to do at the same time with the description of a situa-
tion and its construction, in the sense that to describe it is 
to construct it” (Íñiguez, 2006, p. 75).
Reflexivity5 points to a bi-directional movement 
that operates at all times: the social order is perceived/de-
scribed as objective and real by the members and, at the 
same time, it is this perception/description that constitutes 
and imprints the factual character to social situations.
Adopting the position that daily reflective and in-
dexical practices are those that describe and at the same 
time produce the social world implies a renewed view with 
respect to the social order; a view that dilutes the distinction 
between the explanation that an actor makes of a practice 
and the practice itself, understood as an underlying nucleus 
and prior to explanation. From this perspective, “there is 
no antecedent or code to be followed according to social 
reality; what exists is the action itself as a framework of 
5 It is worth noting that reflexivity in ethnomethodological language is not 
“reflection” in the sense of a conscious mental exercise. When people 
are said to have reflective practices, it does not mean that they reflect 
on what they do. On the contrary, members are not aware of the reflec-
tive nature of their practices (Coulon, 1987), and are not interested in 
circumstances and practical actions as topics of reflection or problema-
tization; if it were not in this way, the natural development of everyday 
activities would be constantly hampered. In this sense, reflexivity as a 
phenomenon becomes visible only when the “natural attitude” with whi-
ch the world is treated daily is abandoned.
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practices and discourses that institutes it at every moment” 
(Íñiguez, 2006, p. 74).
The notion of social action
From the functionalist sociological model, as well 
as from many psychological traditions, understanding so-
cial action involves exploring the motivations of individual 
actors, which in turn would depend on the internalization 
of rules and cultural values typical of the institutions in 
which those actors have been socialized. It is assumed, 
therefore, that the analyst could understand, anticipate and 
explain the reason for social action or individual behavior 
in a particular context, from the knowledge of social rules 
that would be previous/external and which is presupposed 
to organize said context (Heritage, 1995; Ritzer, 1993).
Ethnomethodology criticizes this normative para-
digm of social action and raises a different conceptualiza-
tion of the relationship between rules, actor and action. 
Firstly, it problematizes the budget according to which we 
must explain the action from a question for the motivation 
of the actors, thus seeking an external cause and prior to 
the action itself, which, accounts for its origin. In contrast, 
Ethnomethodology will say that it is necessary to analyze it 
by satisfying the constitutive structures of the action itself, 
its recurrent patterns, which must be understood as local 
and self-organized emergencies resulting from the same 
situated organizational practices (Heritage, 1995 Ritzer, 
1993; Wolf, 1982). In other words, Ethnomethodology re-
places the question of “why” of an action, putting the ques-
tion regarding how it emerges, is organized and sustains 
a particular field of actions in which different individuals 
coordinate with each other; field of actions that contains in 
itself its own intelligibility.
Secondly, Ethnomethodology problematizes the 
idea that recognizable rules in social settings are clear and 
distinct principles that organize and regulate, from the out-
side and regardless of the locally involved actors, events in 
a given situation. Against this image of the rules, it will be 
emphasized that these are always rules-in-use, resources 
mobilized by the actors in order to guarantee the rational-
ity, coherence and continuity of the situation itself. The 
rules in abstract do not inform anything about social ac-
tion, since social action always implies the practical, local 
and contingent articulation of these normative frameworks 
(Wolf, 1982).
This local articulation implies a permanent work of 
interpretation, adjustment and modulation by the partici-
pants in a given situation: How is the rule understood in 
the different moments, uncertain and variable, that define 
a particular context? What are tolerable or even reasonable 
exceptions? What criteria determine which cases are in-
cluded and which are not in the category of compliance or 
non-compliance with expectations? In other words, the nor-
mativity of a situation is not something given in advance, a 
generic formulation that allows to anticipate the sequences 
of action of a social scenario, but, on the contrary, it is an 
achievement of the participants themselves who must de-
cide and negotiate, in the course of the action itself, the 
way in which certain rules are mobilized and updated in a 
specific context (Heritage, 1984, 1995).
It is important to clarify that Ethnomethodology 
does not ignore the value of rules as action organizers, 
what stands out is that rules norms should be understood 
as rules in use, in an active game of negotiation and (re)
interpretation. Rules always have fuzzy contours that must 
be “completed” by the actors within the framework of the 
various reasoning and practical action methods that con-
figure social settings. Paradoxically, it is this flexibility, 
and revisable and interpretable nature of the rules which 
guarantees a certain consistency, continuity and regularity 
of the normative expectations frameworks that support any 
situation of social interaction. As Wolf (1982) points out, 
often the competent use of a rule requires transgressing it 
in certain situations, whereas it is its transgression which 
guarantees the reproduction of the normal state of things, 
which is the main objective of the normative regulations of 
a situation.
In this way, a unique aspect of ethnomethodologi-
cal sensibility consists in rejecting any attempt to impose 
on the internal logic of everyday action some explanatory 
external principle–psychological or macrosocial–that ends 
up making the specificity of said action and its character 
of local and contingent implementation invisible by com-
petent actors. This emphasis on the particular production 
of each social scene, on the need to understand it “from 
within”, from the concrete procedures and practices that 
constitute it and account for it, is crystallized in the notion 
of accountability.
Accountability refers, first, to the fact that all social 
action is describable, intelligible, relatable or analyzable 
by the competent members who participate in it. A situ-
ation is ‘accountable’ in the sense it can be described or 
explained. Likewise, when reporting it we are producing 
this situation. The ‘ accounts’ are a property constitutive of 
reality (Iñiguez, 2006). In this sense, daily actions such as 
describing, analyzing, criticizing and idealizing, become 
the focus of attention of the ethnomethodological, since it 
is these (discursive) actions that configure, in their regular 
and daily execution, the various social scenarios.
From here, it follows that the actors’ reports are 
not mere descriptions of reality, but achievements in situ-
ation, practices of constant reconstruction of a social or-
der that functions as a space of intelligibility so that the 
interaction happens. Thus, accessing people’s accounts is 
not only about knowing how people report situations, but 
about knowing the very seams with which those situations 
are woven.
The notion of accountability can be read as an 
integrative concept that involves the rest of ethnometh-
odological concepts that we have exposed: ‘accounts’ are 
achievements of ‘competent members’ and are ‘indexi-
cal’ as they should not be considered external to the con-
text where they occur. In addition, the accountability is 
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simultaneously ‘reflexive’ and rational: reflexive because 
the accountability of a circumstance or activity is at the 
same time the constituent element thereof; and rational be-
cause it occurs methodically, about activities that can be 
described and evaluated under the aspect of their rational-
ity (Coulon, 1987).
In this way, the ‘accounts’ of a social situation are 
at the same time “informing” and “structuring”. The notion 
of accountability, finally, allows you to think in a differ-
ent way the relationship between action and explanation: 
it challenges the traditional distinction between both ac-
tivities that has permeated social research. The concept of 
accountability suggests that action and its explanation/de-
scription form an inseparable unit: ‘accounts’ are the space 
where social action becomes intelligible and are also the 
constitutive operations of social situations. Explanations 
and descriptions about the world are actions in their own 
right, and use multiple ways to produce and sustain daily 
social situations.
To complete this panorama, and as an illustration of 
how the ethnomethodological view works, we propose the 
reading of a concrete social situation in light of the ethno-
methodological concepts discussed.
Imagine a football match of the Argentine league 
with a crowded grandstand. The people who have come to 
the gathering are competent members because they know 
and practice the communication and conduct codes of this 
context: they agree and take for granted that the interaction 
is informal, where expressions of joy or anger, shouting 
and exaggerated gestures are part of the normal course of 
that scene. Each attendee assumes that the other attendees 
understand the situation and participate in it in the same 
way that he or she is doing it. On the other hand, attendees’ 
verbal insults or vociferations shall not be interpreted as 
a sign of offensive, pathological or inappropriate behavior 
on the part of the people who express them, but the indexi-
cal property of daily language will allow them to be read 
as typical forms of interaction, and even expected, in that 
context. In addition, those attending the stadium will be 
able to report on the activity in which they participate (tell 
a friend on the phone how the game was, tell what is hap-
pening to a frightened child who goes to the stadium for the 
first time), as well as the situation in which they are and, 
in this way, they will be giving meaning and intelligibility 
to the very occurrence of the situation. Thus, in describing 
their own action and that of others within the stadium in 
a particular way, they will be configuring, as the notion 
of reflexivity points out, the specificity and rationality of 
that particular social scene. Finally, it is these descriptions/
explanations, shared knowledge and concrete practices that 
produce the social situation as such and stabilize it as an 
objective social fact. Understanding the logic of these ac-
counts that account for, while producing, the rationality, in-
telligibility and predictability of the scenario in which they 
emerge, allows us to understand that witnessing a football 
match at the stadium is nothing more than accounts, activi-
ties, practices and common knowledge that the competent 
individuals put at risk in that situation and that, recursively, 
produce the situation itself.
The ethnomethodological imprinting of 
discursive psychology
So far we have tried to account for some of the main 
characteristics of the ethnomethodological perspective, 
its particular way of conceptualizing and approaching the 
study of social reality. Our interest is to contribute, through 
this course, to a better understanding of the logic of quali-
tative social research proposed by Discursive Psychology. 
Our thesis is that the specificity of DP within the broader 
field of qualitative psychosocial research, and even within 
the more specific scope of methodological approaches of 
discourse analysis, derives in part from the decisive influ-
ence that the ethnomethodological perspective has had on it.
Indeed, ethnomethodology is only one of the differ-
ent theoretical traditions that come together and serve as a 
foundation for discursive psychology (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Garay, Iñiguez, & Martínez, 2005), which, while ac-
knowledging its influence, also moves away from certain 
arguments and lines of development of ethnomethodology 
(Potter, 2005). In addition, if someone had to locate within 
the methodologies of discourse analysis a nucleus of de-
velopment directly inherited from ethnomethodology, this 
would be that of Conversational Analysis (Wetherell, 2001; 
Sacks, 1992). However, our thesis is that beyond the plural-
ity of antecedents that converge in Discursive Psychology, 
and beyond the heterogeneity and the different nuances 
of the recent developments of the Ethnomethodology, it 
is possible to recognize in the logic of qualitative social 
research proposed by DP an ethnomethodological nucleus 
that is part of its theoretical imprinting and analytical per-
spective of the psychosocial processes.
In what remains of this section we present five con-
siderations that seek to illustrate how the key thesis of the 
Ethnomethodology is present in the logic of research and in 
the empirical work on the discourse of DP.
a) Like Ethnomethodology with its notions of 
reflexivity and accountability, the (social) Discursive 
Psychology meets the centrality of language as constitutive 
of social reality. As argued by Potter & Wetherell (1987), 
“talk is not merely about actions, events and situations, it is 
also a potent and constitutive part of those actions, events 
and situations” (p.21). Rather than treating language as a 
more or less precise representation of an external reality, or 
even more than considering language as a symbolic tissue 
that expresses certain underlying meanings and intentions 
of the social actors that we should interpret, we should try 
to carry out an analysis of the role of language in terms 
of its uses and functions in local and specific contexts. 
Thus, we see how the ethnomethodological consideration 
of language as an indissoluble part of the rationality and 
practical action that the social world produces is taken up 
by DP when proposing a functionally oriented approach to 
the analysis of text and speech (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
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Both in the notion of function (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) 
or action (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and in the motions of 
construction and variability, as axes from which to con-
sider and analyze the discourse proposed by DP, what is 
at stake is an interest in the actions or functions (blame, 
apologize, legitimize, enable) that conveys a discourse, as 
well as a consideration of the constructive and productive 
character of language, both aspects of which can only be 
apprehended according to the specific, local and variable 
character of the different social situations.
b) On the other hand, and like the ethnomethod-
ological proposal of a phenomenological suspension of the 
previous categories (sociological or psychological), DP will 
insist on the need for the analyst not to impose his own 
theoretical categories or judge a priori the domain of action 
that he is seeking to explain. As Edwards (2003) points out, 
a maxim of analysis is that each time the researcher wants 
to add something to the data he must “try to see to what 
extent it is something that the participants themselves (in 
their speech) try or handle in some way. If this question 
does not appear to be a concern of the participants, it should 
consider what it is based on to introduce it” (p.148). Very 
close to Conversational Analysis, and marking differences 
with other forms of discourse analysis such as those related 
to Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1992; Wodak & 
Meyer, 2003) or to the authors closest to Foucault’s work, 
DP will insist on the importance of adopting a strongly em-
pirical perspective that respects to the maximum the own 
logic of the situated action and that reconstructs the sense 
of each situation “from within” of it (Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Wetherell, 2001). It is a form of discourse analysis 
that seeks to avoid to the maximum the theoretical over-
determination of data, as well as overinterpretation, which 
lead the analyst to find in the interactions that he studies 
only what his previous categories tells him to find. This is 
how Wetherell (2001), echoing the more ethnomethodologi-
cal perspective, poses a defense of the
autonomy of the data as an object of study in its own 
right . . . . In conversation and interaction . . . par-
ticipants are building a joint reality, their conversa-
tional actions demonstrate to each other their local 
interpretations of what is going on and the kind 
of event this conversation is. . . .  in this sense the 
World has already been interpreted by the partici-
pants . .  . (p. 386)
This empiricist and inductive logic highly sensitive 
to the local operation of the discursive action present in DP 
is to a large extent also an inheritance of Ethnomethodology 
and of the conversational analysis derived from it. This 
so-called ethnomethodological indifference should not be 
understood as a political indifference or as a lack of criti-
cal perspective, rather it is a style of social research and 
discourse analysis that does not exclude or is contradic-
tory with a strong political commitment of the analyst 
(Wetherell 2001).
c) The emphasis on the practical achievement of 
the social world is another aspect that discursive psychol-
ogy picks up from Ethnomethodology: everyday activi-
ties are considered the tissue and body of what we call 
the “social”. In compliance with the ethnomethodological 
proposal, studying the social reality must consist in fo-
cusing attention on the natural exchanges of every day, 
where the social scenarios and situations are constituted. 
DP is nourished from this perspective to formulate an ap-
proach that is interested in the local, situated and con-
tingent dimension of social actions (Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Garay, Iñiguez, Martínez, 2005).  This sensitivity 
leads it to develop a discourse analysis centered on how 
discursive action locally produces and sustains social re-
ality. Rather than seeking the expression of certain in-
ternal cognitive processes or social macrostructures in 
the discourse, the attention is directed to discourse as an 
action that produces daily versions of the world and indi-
viduals, which constitute the warp, always local, variable 
and contingent, of social reality. As Potter (1990) points 
out, DP is a psychology of practices and offers a method-
ological approach that allows analyzing its specificity. It 
considers that the practices are situated, action-oriented, 
constructed in sequences of interaction and are oriented 
from the local categories and productions (indexical) of 
language of the participants themselves. From this per-
spective, and as we have already pointed out, the objec-
tive of the analysis is not to reveal the internal subjectivity 
or the external social structures that cause and organize 
the discursive action, it is the discursive action itself that 
is constituted in the object of study, and the way in which 
certain versions of the world and of the individuals that 
contribute to the local and contingent achievement of the 
social are emerging from it.
d) A consideration of the reflexive and self-con-
stituted nature of scenarios and social action is another 
common feature between ethnomethodology and method-
ological approaches of DP. As we have shown, activities 
and situations constitute themselves through the imple-
mentation of ethnomethods by the competent members 
in specific occasions. It is from this notion that one can 
understand the empirical work of discursive psychology 
as an effort to visualize and focus on the (auto)constituent 
practices of social life, in the “depth of the self-organized 
surface”. DP does not intend to reveal cognitive or macro-
structural processes that supposedly underlie the activities 
of individuals. The common idea that leads to think that 
behind the manifest practices there are hidden processes 
(cognitive, symbolic, economic, etc.) that govern and orga-
nize them, and that these that precisely need to be discov-
ered disappear. The way in which the relationship between 
actor and rule is reconceptualized, to which we have al-
ready referred, evidences this:
there is nothing like what we call rules that make 
our behavior to be in a certain way, but when we do 
something we are making rules. It is not necessary, 
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therefore, to look for the rule that is behind regulat-
ing our behavior . . . . The rule is not a written code 
or a key that through the observation of people’s 
we can deduce that it exists. The rule is the action 
(Iñiguez, 2006, p. 78-79).
By adopting a view that approaches social pro-
cesses as reflective processes in the ethnomethodological 
sense, DP reverses the schema of the traditional psycho-
logical and sociological perspectives and proposes a dis-
course analysis model that helps to reconstruct in details 
the local, situated and self-organized production of differ-
ent social interactions. What is important is what people 
are doing on a day-to-day basis and how these practices, 
understood as discursive action, constitute the social 
framework, produce versions of the world and of the in-
dividuals, thus stabilizing endogenously organized local 
orders (Edwards & Potter, 1992, Potter, 2000, Potter & 
Wetherel, 1987).
e) Finally, like Ethnomethodology, DP will have as 
one of its research focuses the very task and discourse of 
science, particularly those linked to the field of psychol-
ogy. As it is possible to infer from the works of Garfinkel, 
science must be understood as a social practice that is 
produced through a set of ethnomethods that have a lo-
cally determined value and meaning. In other words, the 
practice of scientists must be understood through the 
same concepts of competent member, indexicality, reflex-
ivity and accountability with which Ethnomethodology 
comprises the different social practices. Both science and 
magic, as well as sport, are offered to the study of ethno-
methodologist’s study as local configurations of action 
and practical reasoning, as “ingenious socially organized 
practices” (Garfinkel, 2006). In the words of Garfinkel 
himself: “no investigation can be excluded, no matter 
when or where they occur, no matter how trivial or vast 
is its focus, organization, cost, duration and consequence; 
“whatever is its success, its reputation, its practitioners” 
(Garfinkel, 2006, p. 43). Within the framework of this 
ethnomethodological inheritance, DP is characterized by 
offering an analytical strategy that allows us to scrutinize 
the discourses and practices of the same scientific disci-
plines, taking into account how they produce particular 
versions of the world and of the individuals that support 
certain forms of social relationship. At the same time, it 
stands out by taking reflexively as an object of analysis 
the discourses that psychology itself produces, explaining 
how they operate rhetorically in an argumentative field, 
in which they pursue certain functions and in which they 
seek to contribute to expand certain versions of the so-
cial world that for reasons of different nature are consid-
ered by specific actors of the field as fertile, virtuous and 
advisable.
Final reflections
The key thesis that we have tried to argue is that 
the specificity and singularity of Discursive Psychology 
as a theoretical perspective and qualitative research ap-
proach in the field of Social Psychology derives from 
the strong influence received from the ethnomethod-
ological perspective. Performing psychosocial research 
and discourse analysis from DP perspective implies a 
particular set of options and theoretical-methodological 
positions. These represent a major break with other 
forms of qualitative psychosocial research anchored in 
rather comprehensive, phenomenological, or interaction-
ist traditions, which often–fundamentally in the form of 
grounded theory or qualitative content analysis–tend to 
be regarded as the only way of qualitative investigation 
of the individuals and social world. Also, as we have 
pointed out, the theoretical-methodological options of 
DP not only assume a specificity within the broad field 
of qualitative research, but also, also, within the vast but 
more limited field of discourse analysis methodologies. 
From the arguments developed, we hope to contribute 
to the recognition, valuation, differentiation and discus-
sion of the great diversity of traditions and options for 
qualitative research in the field of contemporary Social 
Psychology in Latin America.
Contribuições da psicologia discursiva à pesquisa qualitativa em psicologia social: uma análise de seu legado 
etnometodológico
Resumo: Este trabalho tem como objetivo caracterizar a especificidade da psicologia discursiva (PD) como uma proposta 
específica teórica e metodológica para pesquisas qualitativas em psicologia social, diferenciando-se de outras formas de 
pesquisa qualitativa e de análise do discurso. Para isso, destaca-se a importante influência da perspectiva etnometodológica 
como pano de fundo teórico e central da PD, que afeta fortemente sua conceituação do social e na sua abordagem do trabalho 
empírico. Primeiro, caracteriza-se a forma como a etnometodologia aborda o estudo da realidade social, enfatizando o modo 
como concebe o ator, a ordem e a ação social. Depois, chama-se atenção para a forma como a PD se apropria dos princípios 
teóricos e metodológicos da tradição etnometodológica, que permitem compreender melhor a especificidade da PD no campo 
da pesquisa qualitativa em psicologia social.
Palavras-chave: discurso, psicologia social, etnometodologia, pesquisa qualitativa.
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Contributions de la psychologie discursive à la recherche qualitative en psychologie sociale: une analyse de 
son patrimoine ethnométhodologique
Résumé: Le document vise à caractériser la spécificité de la Psychologie Discursive (PD) comme une proposition théorique et 
méthodologique particulier pour la recherche qualitative en psychologie sociale, se différenciant des autres formes de recherche 
qualitative et d’analyse du discours. Pour cela, on remarque l’influence importante de la perspective ethnométhodologique 
comme arrière-plan théorique et central de PD, qui affecte fortement sa conceptualisation du social et l’approche au travail 
empirique. Tout d’abord, la forme dans laquelle l’ethnométhodologie s’approche à l’étude de la réalité sociale est caractérisée, 
en insistant sur la manière dont l’acteur, l’ordre et l’action sociale sont conçus. Ensuite, on se rend compte de la façon dans 
laquelle la PD s’approprie de certains principes théoriques et méthodologiques de la tradition ethnométhodologique, lesquels 
permettent de mieux comprendre la spécificité de PD dans le domaine de la recherche qualitative en psychologie sociale.
Mots-clés: discours, psychologie sociale, ethnométhodologie, recherche qualitative.
Aportes de la psicología discursiva a la investigación cualitativa en psicología social: análisis de su herencia 
etnometodológica
Resumen: Este artículo se propone a caracterizar la especificidad de la Psicología Discursiva (PD) en tanto particular propuesta 
teórica y metodológica para la investigación cualitativa en psicología social, diferenciándola de otras formas de investigación 
cualitativa y de análisis del discurso. Para ello, se destaca la importante influencia de la perspectiva etnometodológica como 
antecedente teórico central de la PD, la cual incide fuertemente en su conceptualización de lo social y en su aproximación al 
trabajo empírico. En primer lugar, se caracteriza la forma en que la etnometodología se aproxima al estudio de la realidad social, 
enfatizando la manera en que concibe al actor, el orden y la acción social. En segundo lugar, se da cuenta del modo en que la 
PD hace suyos ciertos postulados teóricos y metodológicos de la tradición etnometodológica, los cuales permiten comprender 
mejor la especificidad de la PD en el campo de la investigación cualitativa en psicología social.
Palabras clave: discurso, psicología social, etnometodología, investigación cualitativa.
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